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<5-line drop cap initial text><start text>This article should be read as an ongoing dialogue 
between Suzanne Dovi and ourselves about a common concern: the quality of representation 
in general and, in particular, the good substantive representation for women (SRW). We 
strongly share Dovi’s concern that democratic institutions and processes can favor those in 
positions of power and can be used to dominate and oppress. We also are persuaded that for 
democracy to function well, a specific type of representative is required (Dovi 2007). The 
key difference between us is that Dovi’s focus (2002, 2007) is on the individual 
representative’s characteristics and qualities, whereas we turn our focus to the level of 
representative processes. Representation is a process of advocacy and deliberation taking 
place within and outside of formal political institutions, where differences in political 
perspectives are advocated for and deliberated over (Saward 2010; Urbinati 2000; Williams 
1998). SRW in formal institutions such as parliaments—we argue in this contribution—
should meet specific “quality-control” criteria. We defend our preferred conception of good 
representation as procedural but, as we show herein, Dovi’s values of the good representative 
well may be important prerequisites for the good processes that we envisage. 
 Our claim for a shift away from the actors (i.e., women/feminist Members of 
Parliament) and content of SRW (i.e., legislative and policy outcomes) toward a focus on the 
processes of representation stems from two sources. First, we must fully acknowledge that 
women are a highly diverse group with varying and even conflicting interests. Second, we 
 should reject an elision between SRW and feminist substantive representation. In our view, 
good SRW does not occur when the interests of only a limited group of women are 
represented. Neither does it occur when only a specific feminist understanding of gender 
equality is articulated. Instead, good representational processes take seriously the 
heterogeneity of women’s interests while accepting that not all women share feminist ideals. 
 Hence, we judge SRW processes using three criteria. The responsiveness criterion 
assesses the representative claims that are evidently in play and judges them in terms of their 
representative relationship with the represented—that is, the extent to which they are 
responsive to women in society. Following Severs (2010), responsiveness is established when 
either representatives make claims congruent with prior stated interests of the represented or 
the represented a posteriori agree with the claims that representatives formulate on their 
behalf. The inclusiveness criterion addresses the representational processes as a whole and is 
particularly concerned with representative claims that might be excluded. The inclusion of all 
relevant voices is necessary to establish the meaning of what is in women’s interests and to 
counter within-group inequalities (Weldon 2002). The third criterion points to the relative 
status of representatives’ claims. It demands more than the mere ability to equally articulate 
one’s interests; voices should receive equal respect and consideration and be able to generate 
an effect (Severs 2012). 
 Dovi (2015) is critical of our procedural approach. It risks, in her view, being too 
inclusive and therefore ultimately agnostic about outcomes. Dovi is correct to state that there 
can be no privileging of feminist outcomes in our approach, as there can be in her exclusive-
content–based approach. However, we are far from agnostic about outcomes. Indeed, our 
preference for a procedural approach has everything to do with what we see as an unworkable 
conception of what counts as “anti-women” that would serve as the basis for exclusion. 
 Dovi’s content approach returns us to the place from which we feel gender and politics 
scholars needed to retreat: a subjective, a priori definition of women’s interests. 
 That said, Dovi’s critique prompted us to think further about the requirements of 
democratic representatives and to reconsider whether our preferred conception of good SRW 
as a responsive, inclusive, and egalitarian process depends on the nature of individual 
representatives who populate our democratic institutions. As our discussion of Dovi’s three 
values of the good representative demonstrates, we fully recognize the virtue in her good 
representatives. We could not agree more that a representative must be fair-minded and 
engage in critical trust building and good gate keeping. Indeed, we contend that the presence 
of representatives who embody these values is likely critical for good SRW processes. We 
outline how our preferred institutional process is likely interdependent with representatives 
embodying particular qualities and characteristics (Celis, Childs, and Curtin 2016). We also 
importantly contend that these qualities are more realizable collectively than individually. 
Nevertheless, the institutional implementation of our ideal process requires subsequent 
“institutional experimentation” (Williams 1998, 236). The criteria we outline here enable the 
evaluation of existing arrangements, processes, and procedures (Celis, Childs, and Curtin 
2016) and should inform institutional reform that seeks to enhance the quality of SRW. 
 
<heading 1>THE VIRTUE OF FAIR-MINDEDNESS 
<text>For Dovi, a fair-minded representative advances public policies that foster civic 
equality: the equal political standing of citizens. Accordingly, these representatives advance 
not only the policy preferences of their constituents but also the civic equality of all (Dovi 
2007, 101). Only by seeking to increase civic equality can the legitimacy of democratic 
institutions be safeguarded. Such legitimacy is necessary for citizens to seek to resolve their 
conflicts through democratic institutions. Citizens consider democratic institutions to be fair 
 when there is equality in public policy making. All of this implies that a fair-minded 
representative mediates and accommodates disagreements among citizens rather than 
represents particular interests (Dovi 2007, 118–19). 
 Fair-mindedness, although evidently about content, is for Dovi also about how 
outcomes are produced. Policies should seek to “reduce and compensate for inequalities of 
political resources” (Dovi 2007, 111). Citizens’ capacities “to interact as equals” should be 
protected and “shared political status and standing” secured (Dovi 2007, 105), not least by 
“supplementing the political resources available to the worst-off citizens” (Dovi 2007, 113). 
Concerned by citizens’ access to decision makers, a fair-minded representative reaches out to 
those who hitherto have been marginalized by political processes. 
<Insert PQ 1 about here> 
 It perhaps goes without saying that our preferred SRW processes would profit from 
these fair-minded representatives. Like Dovi, what we conceive of as the ideal representative 
process considers conflict about policy preferences and requires granting equal and fair 
consideration to divergent interests. We could not agree more with Dovi’s requirement for 
good representatives to mediate and accommodate disagreement among citizens. However, 
there exist points of differential emphasis and ongoing concerns. First, what constitutes civic 
equality too easily can be presented as a given (Dovi 2007, 108–19). We are concerned—as 
Dovi is—that what constitutes civic equality must be more than formal inclusion as part of 
the demos. She argues that formal, threshold gap approaches should be balanced by a good 
democratic representative (Dovi 2007, 116–17). In our view—and arguably to a greater 
extent than acknowledged by Dovi—the equal political standing of women is realized only 
during the very processes of political representation. This is precisely because what counts as 
civic equality on the ground is often open to debate, as she acknowledges. Hence, any 
 tendency to conceive of it in a generalized way, or to use it as a standard, seems rather 
inadequate to the task of securing good SRW. 
 Second, Dovi makes a trade-off between “advocacy representation = political 
efficacy” and “fair-minded representation of all = democratic efficacy,” in which the latter is 
privileged. She holds that democratic efficacy refers to the “effect” of a policy on civic 
equality rather than a simple “obeying the policy preferences” of the represented or the 
majority (Dovi 2007, 104). In our view, the absence of strong advocacy representation may 
very well undermine both political and democratic efficacy. Moreover, in our approach, the 
apparent trade-off dissolves. The advocacy for particular interests should include the interests 
of all affected, and the subsequent deliberation should be inclusive of all these interests. This 
results in both political and democratic efficacy: representatives are establishing partial 
political efficacy for their own group (in our case, women) and, as a collective, also 
establishing democratic efficacy. 
 A high level of responsiveness is another important benefit and a key ingredient of 
good representation, engendered by our process approach and constrained by Dovi’s fair-
mindedness. Responsiveness is about having one’s interests represented in a focused way by 
one’s representative. That said, once representatives have articulated the interests of their 
constituency, they should—as part of the subsequent deliberation—listen to one another and 
give equal consideration to all opinions. This is when democratic efficacy returns. When 
what is “in the interests of women” is being constituted (Urbinati 2000; Weldon 2002), 
representatives should be willing to let go of their original opinion. Overall, then, the 
representative process of deliberation should deliver democratic efficacy. 
 The third distinction we draw is that Dovi is foremost concerned with citizens’ equal 
access to representatives, whereas we foremost are concerned with equal inclusion of 
citizens’ claims in the representative process. As we understand it, Dovi sees a unique role 
 for elected representatives in that respect. A fair-minded elected representative informs 
herself about the multiple and conflicting interests and opinions that exist in the citizenry and 
makes up her mind about what best serves civic equality. She then represents this view in the 
representation process. In our approach—in contrast to Mendez’s contribution to this special 
issue—the claims of the represented do not have to “pass through” representatives to be 
included in the representative process. Our criterion of inclusiveness also would allow for 
non-elected representatives to advocate for their interests as part of the representation 
process. We further contend that the value of fair-mindedness works differently for the non-
elected (cf. Urbinati 2000): as advocates, their “right” to be partial would be self-evident. 
Furthermore, recognizing that strong fair-mindedness is not demanded of all representatives 
shifts the responsibility for enacting fair-mindedness to the aggregate level: good SRW 
requires guarantees at the system level that the process of representation is inclusive of all 
and that all claims are treated with equal consideration by the collective of representatives 
brought together in the representational process. In our view, it is predominantly through 
such a fair-minded process of representation that disagreement among representatives about 
what is in the interests of the represented can and should be mediated. 
 
<heading 1>THE VIRTUE OF CRITICAL TRUST BUILDING 
<text>The second virtue of a “good representative” refers to the representative’s capacity to 
engage democratic citizens in representation in a way that increases their critical trust. How 
to foster this? Acknowledging that invitations to participate can be “manipulative” rather than 
a source of “self-governance,” good representatives must be sufficiently informed of the costs 
and benefits of particular policies, must be kept accountable by peer or horizontal 
accountability, and must constitute good role models (Dovi 2007). When these conditions are 
fulfilled, citizens can assess when their active participation is needed and when, in contrast, 
 they can rely on the democratic institutions to settle political conflicts (Dovi 2007, 134). 
However, even under optimal conditions, vulnerable groups of citizens might lack the 
capacity or the material resources to participate in the representative processes, thereby 
remaining dependent on potentially abusive others to interpret their interests (Dovi 2007, 
142). 
 The value to our approach of Dovi’s concept of critical trust building lies in its likely 
effect in increasing responsiveness and inclusiveness. The two-way exchange of information 
between represented and representatives should increase the former; the envisaged 
participation of non-elected fosters the latter. We also share Dovi’s concern that vulnerable 
groups still may be limited in their participation. Although we accept that our process 
approach does not have a full solution to this problem, our commitment to the egalitarianism 
criterion goes some way to address this, augmenting Dovi’s critical trust-building virtue. 
Dovi also is highly convincing in describing the qualities, form, and prerequisites of good 
information and participation. But our approach extends her analysis. We conceive of our 
approach as having—in effect—operationalized critical trust building. Our criteria of 
responsiveness, inclusiveness, and egalitarianism work to identify the group or groups (in our 
case, different groups of women) affected by a particular issue: those whose participation is 
required. Our preference for a process approach further requires that representatives engage 
in information giving and responsive-related dialogue with affected groups. These groups 
themselves may be present in the process of representation. A process approach also guides 
when and how to hold fellow representatives to account. 
 
<heading 1>THE VALUE OF GOOD GATE KEEPING 
<text>The value of good gate keeping judges representatives by “the company they keep” 
(Dovi 2007, 145). A good democratic representative’s main purpose is to promote the 
 political inclusion of all democratic citizens (Dovi 2007, 147). To this end, she must expand 
her relationships beyond her own political base and foster mutual relationships with all 
democratic citizens (Dovi 2007, 161–2): political opponents and the marginalized. In short, a 
good democratic representative must actively reach out and seek to obtain full insight in the 
various and conflicting interests at stake. She is neither delegate nor trustee (Dovi 2007, 149–
50); rather, the relationship should be characterized by mutual recognition and trust (Dovi 
2007, 152–3). In all of this, citizens should recognize that their fates are linked with fellow 
citizens (Dovi 2007, 147) and representatives have a role to play: helping citizens to shape 
and consolidate their particular identities by identifying and articulating their interests; 
promoting their identification with the representative (thereby increasing ownership of and 
responsibility for the actions of the representative); and binding them to their democratic 
institution (through interaction with their representatives, citizens can better understand how 
democratic institutions safeguard their well-being) (Dovi 2007, 155–9). 
 Dovi’s third value again speaks strongly to our criteria for good SRW: it cannot be 
established except by reaching out and ensuring that all relevant voices are heard and listened 
to. For underrepresented groups, a good democratic representative not only opens the door 
for their legitimate claims (Dovi 2007, 170) but also acknowledges the complexity of power 
and oppression. She will “limit and constrain the influence of those that exclude unjustly” 
(Dovi 2007,148, 171). 
<Insert PQ 2 about here> 
 In our reading, however, there are qualifications to the value of good gate keeping. 
Imagine a representative of the oppressed who sits at the table with the oppressors. Will the 
oppressed trust that representative? We think that the chances are greater when the 
representative is more exclusively devoted to the interests of the oppressed. Echoing concerns 
regarding fair-mindedness, the represented—especially dispossessed and marginalized 
 groups—will likely benefit from representatives who advocate exclusively for their concerns. 
(See related discussions on the respectability problem by Strolovitch 2008 and on the cultural 
brokerage by Severs and De Jong in this special issue.) Such a representative will likely 
enhance trust on behalf of the represented; mutual relationships between the represented and 
the representative will deepen. Such relationships of trust are necessary for representatives to 
do what Dovi (2007) requires of them. 
 The fact that (women’s) interests are not pre-given but rather fully constituted in the 
course of the representation process through engagement—confrontation, even—with the 
views of others underpins our second concern with Dovi’s gate-keeping role. Vertical and 
“bilateral” relationships between individual representatives and those they claim to represent 
are arguably rather limited in this respect. Individual representatives may not be able to 
establish the necessary array of mutual relationships with those affected by an issue 
(Mendez’s contribution to this special issue is a case in point). Hence, our emphasis on 
inclusion at the system level: the door should be open to all relevant voices. Furthermore, in 
any case, it is during the process of representation that individual representatives come 
together as a collectivity to ultimately identify what is in the interests of all—in our case, 
what is in the interests of women. 
 
<heading 1>CONCLUSION 
<text>As this discussion demonstrates, we see much virtue in the values of fair-mindedness, 
critical trust building, and good gate keeping for processes of good SRW. Although we agree 
with Dovi that these are, for the most part, important at the individual level, we contend that 
they are more realizable by representatives collectively. At the level of representative 
processes, our qualifications to Dovi’s values and the tensions between them also are 
somewhat mitigated. For example, in the case of the former, when individual representatives 
 do not privilege the interests of the dispossessed and marginalized but rather seek on an 
individual basis the representation of all, good outcomes might be more difficult to achieve, 
and critical trust may well be lost for the represented—especially if they are marginalized 
groups. Regarding the latter, shifting to the collective level enables resultant conflicts among 
the three virtues to be both more transparent and capable of being “worked through.” To wit, 
imagine our processes of representation, characterized by inclusion, responsiveness, and 
egalitarianism, populated with representatives collectively embodying Dovi’s good 
representative values. 
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COMP: PULL QUOTES 
<PQ 1> Like Dovi, what we conceive of as the ideal representative process takes into account 
conflict about policy preferences and requires granting equal and fair consideration to 
divergent interests. 
<PQ 2> Echoing concerns regarding fair-mindedness, the represented—especially 
dispossessed and marginalized groups—will likely benefit from representatives who 
advocate exclusively for their concerns. 
